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Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el
From: |
Daiki Ueno |
Subject: |
Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el |
Date: |
Fri, 03 Jun 2011 00:03:18 +0900 |
User-agent: |
Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/23.3 (gnu/linux) |
Ted Zlatanov <address@hidden> writes:
> The discussion petered out, and your proposal was .
(was what?)
> I think my current proposal is a continuation of
> http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.emacs.gnus.general/77009/focus=77208
> where I propose something similar. The key difference is Lars' idea
> of encrypting only pieces of an otherwise unencrypted file.
How those pieces of encrypted data can share the same passphrase?
Otherwise a user will be asked passphrase every time when decrypting
those pieces IIUC - that would be more painful than the current
situation or the unencrypted file solution.
> DU> Anyway I will be happy if:
>
> DU> - Gnus does not ask password when connecting to password-less services
>
> It doesn't.
Why it doesn't? Do you think the current behavior is reasonable enough?
On my modern GNOME desktop environment, NetworkManager etc. do not asks
passwords for password-less services.
> You could also use the Secrets API or propose a new `auth-sources'
> backend that fits your needs (your expertise is greatly appreciated).
Yes, I know, but are you using it daily?
> I like the idea of a pure-data backend, for instance, where all the data
> is in the `auth-sources' entry directly. I would implement it if people
> needed it, but it seems everyone prefers data formats they can share
> with programs outside Emacs.
I don't understand what you are talking about - sounds like a sales talk
by researchers in software engineering academia ;)
Regards,
--
Daiki Ueno
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Stefan Monnier, 2011/06/01
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/01
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Stefan Monnier, 2011/06/01
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/01
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Stefan Monnier, 2011/06/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Robert Pluim, 2011/06/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Daiki Ueno, 2011/06/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Stefan Monnier, 2011/06/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el,
Daiki Ueno <=
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/06/03
- netrc field encryption in auth-source (was: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el), Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/05
- Re: netrc field encryption in auth-source, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/06/26
- GPGME (was: netrc field encryption in auth-source), Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/27
- Re: GPGME, Daiki Ueno, 2011/06/27
- Re: GPGME, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/28
- Re: GPGME, Daiki Ueno, 2011/06/28
- secure plist store, Daiki Ueno, 2011/06/29
- Re: secure plist store, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/06/29