Re: secure boot

[Josselin Poiret]

Hi Antonio,

Antonio Carlos Padoan Junior <acpadoanjr@yahoo.com.br> writes:

> As far as I understand, Guix doesn't provide means to automatically sign
> bootloaders and kernels in order to use UEFI secure boot after each system
> reconfigure (assuming a PKI is properly implemented).  Hence, using
> secure boot with Guix is currently not viable (am i correct?).

You're right, we don't really have any means to do that.  It would have
to be done outside of the store, again, so that the private key doesn't
leak into it.

> In this context, can I assume that the risk of not having secure boot is
> minimized by the fact that in each system reconfiguration, the early
> boot chain is overwritten is such a way that, if a malicious is
> introduced somehow, it will be also overwritten? Am I correct?

A reconfigure would overwrite the bootloader, and most likely create a
new system generation with bootloader configuration.

> In addition, how much more difficult it is to introduce such malicious
> code in a Guix system giving its functional approach and store system?
> (in comparison with others Linux distributions).

Nothing is stopping an attacker from overwriting your bootloader with
their own, which could load a kernel of their choosing.  They would need
to be able to boot off something though.  And once you're compromised
that way, I don't think you could consider running `guix system
reconfigure` an option.

Best,
-- 
Josselin Poiret