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Re: Portability of AF_UNIX connect() permission checks
From: |
Michael Haubenwallner |
Subject: |
Re: Portability of AF_UNIX connect() permission checks |
Date: |
Tue, 04 Mar 2014 08:21:48 +0100 |
User-agent: |
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:17.0) Gecko/20131121 Thunderbird/17.0.9 |
On 03/04/2014 04:21 AM, Noah Misch wrote:
> POSIX specifies EACCES as a "may fail" condition for connect() on an AF_UNIX
> socket; it is a "shall fail" condition for open(). I take this to mean that a
> conforming connect() implementation could ignore directory search permissions
> and/or the socket's own file mode. Indeed, a couple of decades ago, some
> systems did ignore the socket's own file mode:
>
> http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-1999-1402
>
> Do any porting targets of contemporary relevance still behave this way? If
> so, which OS versions are known affected? I have attached a test program that
> illustrates the exact behavior in question, which you can use to test your own
> system if curious.
CVE tells Solaris 2.x:
Can't say for Solaris 2.11, but Solaris 2.10 (sparc & x86) here is affected.
/haubi/