Re: GRUB hardened boot framework

[Robert Millan]

On Fri, Feb 27, 2009 at 10:56:48PM +0100, Jan Alsenz wrote:
> > Hi,
> > 
> > The last stage is much simpler.  Just put /boot/ in a crypted filesystem (we
> > have a patch liing around which is pending to merge).
> 
> Yes, that would also be an idea.
> Then the filesystem needs the authentication.

I'm no crypto expert, but I was under the impression that when the data is
encrypted, measurement comes "for free": if someone tampered it, you'd be
unable to decrypt.  Is this correct?

> > I appreciate your interest in avoiding controversy.  If you want that, then
> > please don't refer to this as "trusted".  It is implied that all the code in
> > GRUB is already trusted by its user.  The difference here is that our system
> > would be hardened against physical attack, it doesn't change anything about
> > who is able to "trust" your computer and who isn't.
> 
> Alright, hardened then.

Thank you

-- 
Robert Millan

  The DRM opt-in fallacy: "Your data belongs to us. We will decide when (and
  how) you may access your data; but nobody's threatening your freedom: we
  still allow you to remove your data and not access it at all."