Re: [PATCH v18 22/25] cryptodisk: wipe out the cached keys from protectors

[Daniel Kiper]

On Fri, Jun 28, 2024 at 04:19:05PM +0800, Gary Lin via Grub-devel wrote:
> An attacker may insert a malicious disk with the same crypto UUID and
> trick grub2 to mount the fake root. Even though the key from the key
> protector fails to unlock the fake root, it's not wiped out cleanly so
> the attacker could dump the memory to retrieve the secret key. To defend
> such attack, wipe out the cached key when we don't need it.
>
> Cc: Fabian Vogt <fvogt@suse.com>
> Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>

Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>

Daniel