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Re: The Perils of Pluggability

From: ness
Subject: Re: The Perils of Pluggability
Date: Mon, 10 Oct 2005 21:40:40 +0200
User-agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0.6 (X11/20050813)

Jonathan S. Shapiro wrote:
On Mon, 2005-10-10 at 13:38 +0200, Alfred M. Szmidt wrote:

In some cases this is true. In some cases it is probably less true than
we would like to believe

  So: plugability is good, and necessary, but there are places where
  it is a very bad idea, and the proc server is a good example of
  where it is bad.

I strongly disagree, me running my own proc server will not affect
anyone, unless they say that they trust my proc server.  And I cannot
tell the other user to trust it.

The problem isn't really trusting your proc server. The problem is that
any time I call a process *created* by your proc server I am trusting
your proc server, and this means that I have to authenticate the process
abstraction itself before I can call anything.

Why do I have to trust the proc server if I want to call a process? But
more in general: what you say might be true. You maybye will sometimes
not be able to do sth. as you don't trust a component. That's
acceptable. But most often (always?) programs don't have to care about,
as such operations will simply fail (imagine e.g. 2 processes usin'
different auth servers)

All of these authentications are certainly possible, but in practice
they are too hard a burden and programmers do not do them.

Let me back up: what functionality is provided by instantiating a new
proc server? Perhaps there is a design that can achieve this securely.




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