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Re: New method to load user bundles
From: |
Martin Brecher |
Subject: |
Re: New method to load user bundles |
Date: |
Sun, 01 Jun 2003 04:13:09 +0200 |
User-agent: |
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.3) Gecko/20030312 |
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Pascal Bourguignon wrote:
|
|
| Yes, this is very important. A whole class of viruses and malware on
| MacOS could run this way, merey being present in some resource files,
| because the system would open them automatically and they would shadow
| application resources.
|
| You cannot let code being automatically loaded and run like that!
|
| If we allow the user to configure such a GSAppKitUserBundles, that
| means that he could download unconspiciously some malware doing the
| same. Then a suid application should have the mean to protect itself
| from such malware.
|
Personally, I don't see why this defaults value gets that much security
related attention now.
Because, well, some malware could just as easily replace your ~/.bashrc
or your ~/GNUstep/Library/WindowMaker/autostart, edit your $PATH or
$LD_LIBRARY_PATH for example. Also, several GNUstep applications store
commands/paths in the user defaults (all the various frontend apps, like
Burn).
Apart from that some malicious bundles can always put themselves into
action by seaming like a prefs bundle, or a GNUMail addon bundle that's
installed into the user's Library/Bundles folder.
In fact every bundle can be overridden by putting something with the
same name in the user's Bundles folder. Thus, even the backend itself -
which is naturally loaded everytime an application is started - can be
overwritten/overridden by some malware, either by placing a fake backend
bundle in the Bundles folder or by modifying the GSBackend defaults
value. (And this seems far more dangerous to me!)
I cannot prevent people from crossing the street when the traffic lights
are red either.
Greetings,
Martin
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