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Re: bit-split, or: the schizophrenia of trusted computing

From: Marcus Brinkmann
Subject: Re: bit-split, or: the schizophrenia of trusted computing
Date: Mon, 01 May 2006 20:30:08 +0200
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At Mon, 01 May 2006 14:07:23 -0400,
"Jonathan S. Shapiro" <address@hidden> wrote:
> Because this usage is absolute and universal in the context of
> protection mechanisms, PLEASE do not confuse the issue by using the
> *legal* sense of enforcement (which simply isn't enforcement at all) in
> any discussion about computer protection or policy. If you *must* use
> it, be careful to qualify it, because it is being used in a context
> where its default meaning is something else.

I believe I was sufficiently clear.  It's ok to ask for clarification,
as misunderstandings can happen.  But I also expect everybody to apply
common sense.

> Do you agree with my statement that in the absence of OS support,
> encapsulation cannot be enforced (in the sense that its violation cannot
> be mechanically prevented) in a shared access computing system?

> I will go further: in the absence of OS support, such violations cannot
> (in general) even be *detected*, so the suggestion that their can be
> deferred to social or legal enforcement actually means that you are
> declaring that these types of encapsulation can be violated without any
> human consequence at all -- or at least that the possibility of such a
> violation with serious human consequence places the problem domain, by
> definition, outside of the applications that are "of interest to the
> Hurd".

I can't parse that paragraph.


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