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Re: [PATCH RFC] memory: Don't allow to resize RAM while migrating

From: David Hildenbrand
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] memory: Don't allow to resize RAM while migrating
Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 15:04:23 -0500 (EST)

> Am 14.02.2020 um 20:45 schrieb Peter Xu <address@hidden>:
> On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 07:26:59PM +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>>>>>> +    if (!postcopy_is_running()) {
>>>>>> +        Error *err = NULL;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +        /*
>>>>>> +         * Precopy code cannot deal with the size of ram blocks 
>>>>>> changing at
>>>>>> +         * random points in time. We're still running on the source, 
>>>>>> abort
>>>>>> +         * the migration and continue running here. Make sure to wait 
>>>>>> until
>>>>>> +         * migration was canceled.
>>>>>> +         */
>>>>>> +        error_setg(&err, "RAM resized during precopy.");
>>>>>> +        migrate_set_error(migrate_get_current(), err);
>>>>>> +        error_free(err);
>>>>>> +        migration_cancel();
>>>>>> +    } else {
>>>>>> +        /*
>>>>>> +         * Postcopy code cannot deal with the size of ram blocks 
>>>>>> changing at
>>>>>> +         * random points in time. We're running on the target. Fail 
>>>>>> hard.
>>>>>> +         *
>>>>>> +         * TODO: How to handle this in a better way?
>>>>>> +         */
>>>>>> +        error_report("RAM resized during postcopy.");
>>>>>> +        exit(-1);
>>>>> Now I'm rethinking the postcopy case....
>>>>> ram_dirty_bitmap_reload() should only happen during the postcopy
>>>>> recovery, and when that happens the VM should be stopped on both
>>>>> sides.  Which means, ram resizing should not trigger there...
>>>> But that guest got the chance to run for a bit and eventually reboot
>>>> AFAIK. Also, there are other data races possible when used_length
>>>> suddenly changes, this is just the most obvious one where things will;
>>>> get screwed up.
>>> Right, the major one could be in ram_load_postcopy() where we call
>>> host_from_ram_block_offset().  However if FW extension is the major
>>> use case then it seems to still work (still better than crashing,
>>> isn't it? :).
>> "Let's close our eyes and hope it will never happen" ? :) No, I don't
>> like that. This screams for a better solution long term, and until then
>> a proper fencing IMHO. We're making here wild guesses about data races
>> and why they might not be that bad in certain cases (did I mention
>> load/store tearing? used_length is not an atomic value ...).
> Yeah fencing is good, but crashing a VM while it wasn't going to crash
> is another thing, imho.  You can dump an error message if you really
> like, but instead of exit() I really prefer we either still let the
> old way to at least work or really fix it.

I‘ll do whatever Juan/Dave think is best. I am not convinced that there is no 
way to corrupt data or crash later when the guest is already running again 
post-reboot and doing real work.

> When I say "really fix it", I mean we can even start to think about
> the shrinking case and how to support that for postcopy.  For example,
> in the above case host_from_ram_block_offset() will return NULL then,
> and the fix could be that we drop that extra page because we don't
> need that any more, instead of bailing out.

I have patches on the list that will make everything exceed used_length 
inaccessible. If there is still an access, we will crash. Printing a warning 
might help figure out what went wrong.

I have a patch lying around that allocates the bitmaps only for the 
used_length. Access outside of that (esp. receiced bitmap) will, well, depends, 
crash or mess up data. Printing an error might help to figure out what went 
wrong. Maybe.

Just FYI how I found this issue and why I want to sanitize the code. And we are 
trying to keep something alive here that never could have worked 100% reliably 
as it is inherently racy.


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