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[Duplicity-talk] PASSPHRASE, the environment, memory, etc.


From: Neal Clark
Subject: [Duplicity-talk] PASSPHRASE, the environment, memory, etc.
Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2007 16:18:08 -0700

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Hi all,

This is my first post to this list. I am using, or trying to use, or considering using Duplicity to back up some sensitive data at work. I have one question in particular.

I don't want anyone but my team to have access to our backup data. I am in a somewhat funny position, in that the remote file storage provider we've gone with is owned by the same person who owns the company where we colocate the machine that is being backed up. So, it seems that I cannot keep my secret key's passphrase anywhere on the system that is being backed up. Make sense?

What i've come up with so far is, another machine completely unaffiliated with either service provider remote shells into the backup target say, 1 minute before the backup starts, writes the secret key to /tmp/some_file, and then duplictiy is called as

'PASSPHRASE=`cat /tmp/some_file` duplicity [options] [etc]'

And then delete /tmp/some_file a minute after the backup is scheduled to start.

So given this way of going about things, my passphrase will reside in duplicity's environment. Can anyone with more knowledge/experience than I have tell me, how difficult is it for an attacker to fish my password out of memory? I'm guessing it resides there the whole time, since duplicity is apparently calling gpg everytime it cooks up another 5mb tar file, right?

Basically, I'm just asking your guys' opinion on how I could harden this setup.

Thanks,
Neal
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